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THESE ARE A FEW OF MY LEAST FAVORITE THINGS
RICHARD C. AUSNESS*

I.

Introduction

The Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") can trace its origins back to a Model
Probate Code promulgated by the American Bar Association ("ABA")'s
section on Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law in 1946.1 In 1962, the Section
on Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law, along with National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began work on what was to become the
original UPC. 2 The National Conference and the ABA's House of Delegates
approved the UPC in 1969.3
The 1969 UPC was an attempt to modernize some of the traditional rules

4
and provide a degree of uniformity for the American law of wills and intestacy.
In general, the original UPC did a good job of achieving these goals. The 1990
revised UPC was somewhat more ambitious. It introduced entirely new
concepts such as "harmless error" and substantially changed longstanding rules

*Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A.1966; J.D. 1968 University of
Florida; LL.M. Yale Law School 1973. I would like to thank the University of Kentucky Rosenberg
College of Law for supporting this research.
Robert whitman, Revocation and Revival: An Analysis of the 1990 Revision of the Uniform Probate
Code and Suggestionsfor the Future, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1035, 1041 (1992).
2 Id. at 1042.

3 Id.

4 See id. at 1041 (providing that the purpose of the ABA was to promote uniformity in laws).
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on descent and distribution and elective share rights for surviving spouses. 5
Unfortunately, some of the 1990 UPC's sections are unnecessarily confusing
and complex, while others seem excessively vague and open-ended. This
Article will identify some of the worst offenders and suggest ways to improve
them.
Part II discusses the doctrine of representation and advocates replacing

the Code's per capita at each generation rule with the more traditional per capita
with representation approach.6 Part III examines the harmless error rule, or

dispensing power, which allows a court to probate a will even though it has not
been properly executed.7 Part IV is concerned with the treatment of revival in
the 1990 UPC. This section further explores why only a few jurisdictions have
adopted said revival as most courts are turned off by the provision's complex
arrangement of presumptions going every which way. Part IV suggests a return

to the 1969 UPC's treatment of revival.8 Part V provides a critique of the
revised UPC's anti-lapse provision.9 Not only is this provision much too long
and complicated, but it makes it unnecessarily difficult for a testator to allow a
gift to lapse. Finally, Part VI analyzes the concept of ademption by extinction
and recommends that the 1990 UPC's provision on ademption be jettisoned and
replaced by the 1969 UPC's more workable version.' 0
II.

Intestate Succession.

Sections 2-101 through 2-114 of the 1990 UPC are concerned with
intestate succession. Although some of these provisions are beneficial, others,
such as sections 2-106(b) and (c) are more problematic. Section 2-106 modifies
the traditional law of representation by introducing the concept of per capita at
each generation."

5Id.
6 See UNIF. PROB. Code § 2-106 (1990) (stating that "[e]ach surviving descendant in the nearest
generation is allocated one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the
same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants as if the surviving
descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants had predeceased the
decedent.").

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1969).
' See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509 (1990).
9See UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-603 (1990).
0 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-606 (1990).
" See Unif. Prob. Code § 2-106 (1990).
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A. The Traditional Law of Descent and Distribution.
Until recently, English law distinguished between real property and
12
personal property as far as descent and distribution were concerned. Freehold
estates in land descended under the rule of primogeniture and could not be
devised by will until 1540.' Under this principle, when the owner died, his real
property descended to the eldest son to the exclusion of daughters and younger
sons.1 4 The decedent's widow received a life interest in a third of the property
under the concept of dower.15 Any litigation over the devise of real property
took place in one of the royal courts.16
In England, the distribution of personal property was the domain of the
ecclesiastical courts.' 7 In 1670, Parliament codified the law of descent and
8
distribution for personal property in the Statute of Distribution.1 This statute

provided that when a decedent died intestate, one-third of his "surplus" estate19
would be distributed to his widow. 20 The remainder of the estate would be
2
distributed to the decedent's children or their representatives in equal shares. 1
If there were no children (or descendants of children), the remaining property
22
would be distributed to the decedent's next of kin in equal degree. Finally, the
statute provided that the issues of deceased children would take the share of the
estate that their ancestor would have been entitled to.23 In 1857, Parliament
removed probate testamentary matters from the ecclesiastical courts and
transferred it to the Court of Probate. 24 This new court exercised probate
5
jurisdiction over both real and personal property.
Most American intestacy statues, which now apply to both real and
personal property, are loosely modeled after the English Statute of Distribution.
In contrast to the so-called civil law approach under which those of equal degree
of kinship take an equal share, these statutes incorporate a parentelic system of

"

Thomas E. Atkinson, Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 Mo. L. REV. 107, 124

(1943).

" 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540). However, primogeniture continued to control the descent of intestate real

property until 1925. Administration of Estates Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 23 (1925).
'4 Anne-Marie Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 ACTEC J. 143, 151-52 (2010).
* Cornelius J. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property § l1 D at 55 (2d ed. 1962).
16 Anne-Marie Rhodes supranote 14, at 158-59.
17

Id.

1822
'9
20

& 23 Car. 2, c. 10(1670).

That is, the remainder of the decedent's estate after the payment of debts. Id.

Id.

21 Id.
22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Court of Probate Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77(iii)-(iv) (1857).

2s Thomas E. Atkinson, supra note 12, at 124.
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descent and distribution under which the issue of the nearest ancestor take
before the issue of a more remote ancestor. 26 For example, descendants of the
decedent take ahead of all other relatives.2 7 If there are none, the decedent's
parents or descendants of the decedent's parents (other than those of the
decedent) take next. 28 This would include ancestors and collateral relatives such
as siblings, nieces, nephews and descendants of nieces, and nephews. 29
Descendants of the decedent's grandparents would take next if there were no
surviving first line collaterals. 30 These would include aunts and uncles, first
cousins, and their descendants. 31 For the most part, the UPC also follows this
approach,3 2 although it allows descendants of a deceased spouse to take if there
are no surviving first or second line collaterals.3 3 Furthermore, while many state
statutes allow more remote collaterals (so called "laughing heirs")34 to inherit, 35
the UPC does not. 36
Virtually all states allow an heir to take a deceased parent's share by
representation.37 The 1969 UPC provided that in cases of intestacy a decedent's
estate would be divided into as many shares as there were surviving heirs in the
nearest degree of kinship. 38 If a decedent's heir predeceased the decedent but
left a surviving issue, the surviving issue would take the heir's share. 39 For
example, if the decedent who died intestate had four children and one of them
predeceased the decedent but left two surviving children (and no predeceased
children), the heir's one-quarter share would be divided among the two
children. Although the surviving children in the above example inherited from
the decedent, they took their deceased parent's share by representation.

26 Id.
27 UNIF. PROB. CODE
28 Id.
29 Id.
30

§ 2-103.

Id.

31 See

Id.

§ 2-103(a) (1990).
33 Id. at § 2-103(b).
" David V. DeRosa, Intestate Succession and the LaughingHeir: Who Do We Want to Get the Last
Laugh?, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 153, 158 (1997).
32 UNIF. PROB. CODE

3

Id. at 164.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103(a) (1990).
"7 See generally C. R. McCorkle, Descent and distribution to and among cousins, 54 A.L.R.2d 1009
(1957) (stating that "provisions entitling the issue, children, or representatives of deceased members of
a class of relatives constituting the intestate's heirs or next of kin, to take by representation, or
permitting representation among collaterals generally.....
3 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-106 (1969).
39 Id.
36
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B. The Uniform Probate Code.
According to the drafters of the 1990 UPC, taking by representation
under the traditional rule could result in an unequal allocation if two groups of
relatives took a share of the decedent's estate by representation. 40 For example,
assume that two of the decedent's three children predeceased him. The first
predeceased child had two children and the second predeceased child had three
children. Had they all survived, each of the decedent's children would have
received one-third of the decedent's net probate estate. However, under the
principle of representation, the two children of the first predeceased child would
each take one half of their parent's share of one-sixth of the estate, while the
three children of the second predeceased child would each take one-ninth of the
estate. The drafters of the UPC believed that the decedent would want each
41
grandchild to take an equal share. Their solution to this problem was to adopt
42
the principle of per capita at each generation.

This approach calls for the remaining share of the decedent's estate to be
calculated at each generation, thereby equalizing the amount each heir in that
generation receives. 4 3 In the example discussed above, the decedent had three
children, one of whom survived. Applying per capita at each generation, the

decedent's surviving child would receive one-third of the net probate estate.
The remaining two-thirds would be divided equally among the five
grandchildren. In other words, each grandchild would receive two-fifteenths of
the decedent's net probate estate. The comment to

§ 2-106(b) claims that a

survey of client preferences conducted by the Fellows of the American College
of Trust and Estate Counsel ("ACTEC"), clients preferred per capita at each
44
generation to the traditional approach embodied in the 1969 UPC.
C. Critique
Although this approach has the virtue of equalizing the shares of those

who are in an equal degree of kinship with each other, it seems overly complex
for those who are mathematically challenged. Even more complex is the UPC's
45
application of per capita at each generation to inheritance by collaterals

Although a case can be made that a decedent would want his grandchildren to
40 See UNIF. PROB. CODE
41

§ 2-106, cmt.

6.

Id.

4 Per capita at each generation was first proposed by Professor Lawrence Waggoner in the 1970s. See
Lawrence W. Waggoner, A ProposedAlternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for Intestate

Distribution among Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 626 (1971-1972).
" UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-106(b).
44 UNF. PROB. CODE § 2-106, cmt. (citing Raymond H. Young, Meaning of "Issue" and
"Descendants, " 13 ACTEC PROB. NOTES 225 (1988)).
45 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-106(c).
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receive an equal share of his estate, it is more difficult to argue that a decedent
would care if more remote heirs, such as nieces and nephews, received equal

shares or not.
The difficulty of applying per capita at each generation outweighs
whatever benefit the present UPC rule provides. Therefore, it would be better
to return to the per capita with representation approach which most states
continue to follow.
III.

The "Harmless Error"Rule.

The 1969 UPC broke new ground by departing from the English Wills Act
model and adopting a simpler approach based on the Statute of Frauds. 46 The
1990 version, as revised slightly in 2008, largely retained the structure of the
1969 provision. 47 However, the 1990 UPC introduced considerable uncertainty

into the execution process by adopting a so-called harmless error rule. 48
A. Strict Compliance with Will Formalities.
The requirements for a valid will have undergone considerable changes
over the centuries. Prior to the Statute of Frauds, few formalities were required
for either wills or testaments.4 9 However, in 1677, the English Parliament
enacted the Statute of Frauds, which specified certain formalities for wills
involving real property. 50 Specifically, it required that a valid will be in writing,
signed by the testator, or by another at the testator's direction and in his
presence, and attested by three or four credible witnesses. 51
In 1837, Parliament passed the English Wills Act that applied to both real
and personal property.5 2 This statute required that a will be in writing, signed
at the foot or end thereof by the testator or by some person in his presence and
by his direction.53 In addition, the Wills Act required that the signature be made
or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses
present at the same time who attested and subscribed the will in the presence of

See generally UNIF. PROD. CODE §§ 2-502, 2-503 (1969) (outlining the requirements for a valid
will).
47 Cf, UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1990) with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969).
46

48 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503.
" See 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540) (allowing land to be devised by will with little formalities).
50 29 Car. 2, c. 3, xii (1677).
5' Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook on the Law of Wills, § 3 at 19-21 (2d ed. 1953); UNIF. PROB. CODE

§§

2-502, 2-503 (1969).
2 7 wm. & 1 Vict. Ch. 26,
SId. at

§9.

§ 3 (1837).
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the testator. 54 Many American jurisdictions modeled their own wills acts after
this legislation."
As Stevens v. Casdorph illustrates, failure to strictly comply with these
56
additional requirements caused many wills to be invalid. There, Patricia and
Paul Casdorph took the testator, Homer Miller, to a local bank to execute his
will." Homer signed his will in the presence of Debra Pauley, a bank employee,
58
who apparently did not sign the attestation clause. Debra then took the will
to two other bank employees, located in different parts of the bank, for the
purpose of having them sign as witnesses.59 Homer did not accompany her to
either of their work areas. 60 Nor did he see either of the bank employees sign
or acknowledge the will.6 1 On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals observed that the state's Wills Act required the testator to sign or
62
acknowledge his or her will in the presence of two witnesses at the same time.
However, neither witness signed the will in the presence of the testator or in the
63
presence of each other as required by the Wills Act. Because none of these

formalities were satisfied, the Court concluded that the will had not been
properly executed.64
To prevent issues like this from happening in the future, the drafters of
the 1969 UPC rejected the Wills Act approach and simply required that the will
be in writing, signed by the testator or someone in his presence and at his
direction, and it be signed by at least two persons who had witnessed the
65
testator's signing or acknowledgement of the document. In addition, section
2-502 recognized holographic wills which had to be written and signed by the
66
testator, but which did not have to be witnessed.
The 1990 and 2008 revisions of the UPC closely tracked the 1969 version
except that they consolidated the provisions for standard wills and holographic
wills into one section and the 2008 revision allowed testators to acknowledge
s4 Id.
5 Anne-Marie Rhodes, supranote 14, at 419-20.
56 Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W. Va. 1998); see also In re Estate of Hennegahn, 45
A.3d 684, 688 (D.C. 2012) (requiring strict compliance with wills act formalities); In re Estate of

Chastain, 401 S.w.3d 612, 620 (Tenn. 2012).
5 Casdorph,508 S.E.2d at 611.
5s Id.
s9 Id.
601Id. at 612.
Id. at 611-12.
62 Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d at 612.
63 Cadsdorph, 508 S.E. 2d, 610, 612.
64
65

Id. at 613.
UNIF. PROB. CODE

66

Id.

§ 2-502.

§ 2-502 (1969).

238

QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

their wills before a notary public as an alternative to having it attested by
witnesses in the traditional manner. 67
B. Substantial Compliance and the Harmless Error Rule.
In an abundance of caution, the drafters of the 1990 revision also adopted
a provision, known as the harmless error rule, that provided relief to testators
who were even unable to comply with the minimal formalities of the UPC's
execution statute. 68 The concept of harmless error originated in the research
that Professor Langbein conducted on its use in the state of South Australia. 69
Professor Langbein had previously proposed that a will should be
admitted to probate if it "substantially complied" with the applicable
formalities. 70 Under this substantial compliance doctrine, a will that failed to
fully comply with the requirements of the Wills Act would not be automatically
invalidated.71 Instead, the court could probate the noncomplying instrument
after considering (1) whether it accurately expressed the decedent's
testamentary intent and (2) whether it sufficiently approximated the required
formalities to enable the court to conclude that it served the evidentiary and
protective purposes of the wills act. 72 Although the Australian state of
Queensland adopted the substantial compliance doctrine statutorily in 1981,
only a few American jurisdictions embraced it.73 Reviewing the experience in
Queensland, Professor Langbein concluded that the Australian courts
interpreted their substantial compliance doctrine as a near-miss standard,
ignoring the question of whether the testator's conduct evidenced testamentary
intent or not.74

In light of the disappointing experience with the substantial compliance
doctrine in Queensland, Professor Langbein proposed a new approach based on
a statute enacted in the state of South Australia in 1975.75 Although the
Australian name for this concept, the dispensing power, is a more accurate

description of the principle, the drafters of the 1990 UPC chose to call it the
harmless error rule after including it the revised UPC. 76 In its present form,

67
68

Id.

71

Id.

§ 2-502 (1990,

2008).
§ 2-503 (1969).
69 John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills:
A Report on Australia's
TranquilRevolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1987).
70 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975).
UNIF. PROB. CODE

Id. at 514-26.
7 See generally In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991).
72

74 Langbein, supra note
7

76

69, at 53.
Langbein, supra note 70, at 514.

Id.
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section 2-503 allows a document that fails to comply with the requirements of
section 2-502 to be given effect if the proponent of the document establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the writing to
constitute (1) the decedent's will; (2) a partial or complete revocation of the

will, (3) an addition to or alteration of the will, or (4) a partial or complete
77
revival of a formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of a will.
The comment to section 2-503 claims that this provision unifies the law
of probate and non-probate transfers by extending to wills the harmless error
principle that has long been applied to non-probate transfers. 78 Furthermore,
the comment declares that by placing the burden of proof upon the proponent
of the defective instrument and by imposing a clear and convincing evidence
standard, section 2-503 imposes procedural standards that are commensurate
with the seriousness of the issue.7 9 Finally, the comment citing favorable
experiences in Australia and Israel declares that the harmless error rule will not
increase litigation and might even discourage it. 80
C. Critique.
Section 2-503 is well-intentioned, but it is still problematic. One concern
is that section 2-503 undermines section 2-502's modest but sensible
requirements for execution to protect a group of people who are unable to
8
follow even the simplest directions for executing a will. 1 Secondly, the scope
of section 2-503's harmless error rule seems unnecessarily broad. For example,
rather than extending section 2-503 to revocation and revival, perhaps if it is

retained at all, its scope should be limited to wills and codicils. 82 Furthermore,
assuming that it is retained, section 2-503 should be restricted to attestation
problems and not be applied to failure to comply with signature requirements
83
or the requirement that a will be in writing.

Finally, notwithstanding the assurances of the drafters, the harmless error
rule is almost certain to encourage litigation. After all, disappointed
beneficiaries under a defectively executed will have little to lose (except
litigation costs) by asking a sympathetic court to use its dispensing power to

correct a testator's failure to execute his will properly.

7

UNIF. PROB. CODE

7

Id.

§ 2-503 (1990).

79 Id.
80 Id.

81 UNIF. PROB. CODE
82 Id.
83

Id.

§§ 2-502, 2-503.
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Revival
A. An Overview of the Doctrine of Revival.

The doctrine of revival provides that the revocation of a subsequent will
can reactivate or "revive" a will that has previously been revoked. 84 For
example, a testator executes a valid will (Will 1). The testator subsequently
executes a new will (Will 2), also valid, which purports to revoke Will 1. Later,
the testator revokes Will 2 by physically destroying it. In former times, the
revocation of Will 2 would automatically revive Will 1 and at the testator's
death, his or her property would be distributed according to the terms of Will
1.85

Thus, revival requires two revocatory acts. First, the will to be revived
(Will 1) must have been revoked by a subsequent testamentary instrument.
Then, a second will (Will 2) must be executed and subsequently revoked in
order to revive Will 1.86 The Wyoming Supreme Court in In re Estate of

Stringer identified five possible outcomes when a will was revoked by a
subsequent will which was also revoked by the testator. 87 One result would be
that the earlier will would be revived as a matter of law. 88 That was the
approach of the English common law courts. The common law courts ruled
that the original will was automatically revived, as long as it had not been
destroyed, and no proof of an intent to revive the will was required. 89 The
common law rule was based on the notion that wills were ambulatory in nature,
that is, that they would not have any legal effect until the testator's death. 90
Thus, the revocation of the first will would not become so effective until the
testator's death, but if the testator had revoked the second will, that revocation
would also become effective at the testator's death, leaving the first will

'

intact.9

A second approach provides that the question of revival is one of
intention with no presumption either for or against revival. 92 This was the rule

" Samuel A. Persky, Comment, Effect Upon a Priorand Existing Will of the Revocation of a
Subsequent Will Containingan Express Revocation Clause, 32 YALE L. J. 70, 71 (1922).

85 Id.
86

Id.

8 In re Stringer's Estate, 343 P.2d 508 (Wyo. 1959), modified, 345 P.2d 786 (Wyo. 1959).
88
Id. at 515.
89 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1054.
9 Goodrightv. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 2514 (1770); Hyatt v. Hyatt, 120 S.E. 830, 833 (1924).
9' Stetson v. Stetson, 66 N.E. 262, 614-15 (Ill. 1903); Marsh v. Marsh, 48 N.C. 77, 79, 64 Am. Dec.
598 (1855); Bates v. Hacking, 68 A. 623, 625 (R.I. 1907).
92 Alvin E. Evans, Testamentary Revival, 16 KY. L.J. 47 (1927). (However, as a practical matter, the
proponent of the former will would have to show that the testator intended to revive it). Id. at 47-48.
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followed by the English ecclesiastical courts, which oversaw the probate of
personal property, regarded the revoking instrument as effective at the time of
its execution. 93 Therefore, when a revoking will itself was revoked, these
courts would allow the first will to be revived if there was sufficient evidence
94
Oral
that the testator revoked the second will in order to revive the first.
testimony was admissible to prove the presence or absence of an intent to revive
96
a revoked will. 95 A number of American courts also followed this approach.
The third approach emphasizes that the earlier will would be revived
unless there was evidence of a contrary intent. 97 This approach is also based on
the notion that wills were ambulatory in nature. Thus, if the subsequent will is
revoked, it leaves the prior will as if the latter will never existed unless it can
be proved that the testator revoked the second will with the intention of dying
intestate.98

According to the fourth approach, the earlier will is not revived unless an
99
intent to revive can be shown. This is the mirror image of the third approach

which applies a presumption in favor of revival. In contrast, the fourth approach
1 00
applies a presumption against revival.

Lastly, some courts have held that the earlier will shall not be revived
except by re-publication. 101 This was the approach taken by the English Will

Act of 1837, which provided that a revoked will could only be revived if the
testator re-executed the first will or executed a codicil demonstrating an intent
to thereby revive the first will.'0 2 This approach was adopted by some American
courts in the nineteenth century.1 03 The rationale for this rule is that neither will
necessarily reflected the intent of the testator. 10 4 Nowadays, many states have
105
enacted anti-revival statutes that follow this approach.

93 Id.
9 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1054-55.

9 Bates v. Hacking, 68 A. 622, 625 (R.I. 1907).
96 See generally Blackett v. Ziegler, 133 N.W. 901 (Iowa 1913); Williams v. Miles, 94 N.W. 705, 70809 (Neb. 1903); In re Davis' Estate, 35 A.2d 880, 888 (N.J. 1944); In re Gould's Will, 47 A. 1082,
1083-84 (Vt.1900); see also Joseph Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARv. L. REV. 337,

341 (1920).
9 Stringer, 343 P.2d at 515.
98 Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357, 393 (1863); Williams 94 N.W.at 709.
99 Bailey v. Kennedy, 425 P.2d 304, 306-07 (Colo. 1967); Williams 94 N.W.at 709; In re Moore's Will,
65 A. 447, 449 (N.J. Perog. Ct.1907).
'00In re Bassett's Estate, 238 P.2d 666, 669 (Cal. 1925).
'0' Driver v. Sheffield, 85 S.E.2d 766, 767 (Ga. 1955).
02 7 Wm. 4 & 1Vict., ch. 26, § 22 (1837).
03 Lively v. Harwell, 29, 20 Ga. 509, 516 (Ga. 1859).
1 Id.
"' Thomas E. Atkinson, Law of Wills § 92 at 477-78 (2d ed. 1953).
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The English Wills Act of 1837 provided that a revoked will could only
be revived if the testator re-executed it or executed a codicil which showed an
intention to revive the first will.1 06 In the United States, many anti-revival
statutes allow a testator to revive a will in this manner. 107 When a will has been
revoked by a subsequent will, a codicil to the revoked will not only revives it,
but also revokes the intervening will.1 08 This doctrine of republication by
codicil is illustrated by Kimbark v. Satas.109 In that case, Walter Savickas
executed a valid will in 1961 which bequeathed sums of money to various
relatives and charities. 1 0 Later, in 1964, Walter executed a second will on a
one-page printed form."' This document revoked the 1961 will and left
Walter's property to two persons who were not related to him."

2

Finally, in

1965, Walter executed a document which purported to be a codicil to the 1961
will." 3 Although the beneficiaries of the 1964 will claimed that the codicil did
not revive the 1961 will because Walter did not express any clear intent to do
so, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that he intended to
distribute his estate according to the provisions of the 1961 will." 4
B. The Uniform Probate Code.
Section 2-509(a) of the 1969 Code declared that:
[i]f a second will which, had it remained effective
would have revoked the first will in whole or in
thereafter revoked by acts under Section 2-507, the
is revoked in whole or in part unless it is evident
circumstances of the revocation of the second will

at death,
part, is
first will
from the
or from

testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations that he
effect as executed." 5

intended the first will to take

This provision was similar to the English Wills Act as far as revival is
concerned because both statutes create a presumption against revival." 6

106 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1055.
107 See, e.g., In re Estate of Stormont, 517 N.E.2d 259, 251 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); In re Estate of

Wilson, 397 P.2d 805, 808 (Wyo. 1964).
'8

Atkinson, supra note 105, at 469.

09 Kimbark v. Satas, 231 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
0
" Id. at 699-700.
' Id. at 700.
112 Id.
3

"

Id.

See Kimbark, 231 N.E.2d at 701.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509(a) (1969).
116 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1055.
114
"s
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However, unlike the English statute, the UPC allows a court to find that a
revival has occurred if it concludes that adequate evidence of an intent to revive
exists."' In addition, neither statute distinguishes between completely and
partially revoked wills.' 18
White v. Wilbanks provides an example of the effect of the UPC's
presumption against revival.'" 9 The testator in that case, Samuel Chapman,
executed a will in 1980 and executed another will in 1982.120 After his death
in 1985, the 1980 will and a copy of the 1982 will were both offered for
probate.' 2 '

According to the Probate Court, because the original 1982 will

could not be found, it was presumed that the testator destroyed it animo
revocandi.12 2 Since there was no evidence that Samuel intended to revive the
23
The
1980 will, the Probate Court concluded that he died intestate.
Intermediate Appellate Court reversed, finding that since the testator died prior
to the adoption of the UPC, the common law rule of automatic revival should
have been applied. 24 However, upon further appeal, the state Supreme Court

held that the recently adopted UPC presumption against revival was
applicable. 2 5 Since the lower court had found no evidence of an intent to
26
revive, the state Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Probate Court.1
The 1990 UPC's revision of section 2-509 is considerably more
complicated than its predecessor. It features three subsections, each of which
is subject to a presumption with respect to revival. Subsections 2-509 (a) and
2-509 (b) are concerned with wills that are wholly or partially revoked by
physical act under section 2-507 (a) (2). Subsection (a) declares that:

If a subsequent will that wholly revoked a previous will is
thereafter revoked by a revocatory act under section 2-507 (a)

(2), the previous will remains revoked unless it is revived.
The previous will is revived if it is evident from the
circumstances of the revocation of the subsequent will or
from the testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations

7
8

'1

Id.
Id. at 1056.

119 White v. Wilbanks, 393 S.E.2d 182 (S.C. 1990).
120 Id.
121

22

123

124

Id. at 183.

Id.

Id.
White, 393 S.E.2d at 183.

12 Id.
126

Id.
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that the testator intended the previous will to take effect as
executed.12

The comment to section 2-509 explains that the "burden of persuasion" is on
the proponent of the first will to show that the testator intended to revive it by
destroying the second will. 128 The comment also declares that "[t]he
presumption against revival imposed by subsection (a) is justified because
where Will # 2 wholly revoked Will # 1, the testator understood or should have
understood that Will # 1 had no continuing effect."1 29
Unlike the original version of section 2-509, the new version
distinguishes between complete revocation, covered in subsection (a), and
partial revocation, covered in subsection (b). Subsection (b) provides that:
If a subsequent will that partly revoked a previous will is
thereafter revoked by a revocatory act under section 2-507 (a)
(2), a revoked part of the previous will is revived unless it is
evident form the circumstances of the revocation of the
subsequent will or from the testator's contemporary or
subsequent declarations that the testator did not intend
the
revoked part to take effect as executed. 130
Thus, under the UPC's scheme, there is a presumption of revival when
the second will wholly revokes the first will and is then revoked by physical
act; but when a second will (or codicil) only partially revokes the first will and
is then revoked by physical act, there is a presumption against revival.13' The
comment to of section 2-509 justifies this by claiming that where the second
will is only a codicil to the first will, the testator would know, or should know,
that the first will has a continuing effect. 3 2 Therefore, it is appropriate to
assume in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the testator would expect
the material partially revoked by the second will to be reinstated when the
second will was revoked by physical act.1 33
Finally, subsection (c) addresses the case where the subsequent will is
revoked not by physical act, but by yet another will. This provision states that:

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
"2 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509 cmt.
29 Id. (emphasis omitted).
127

3 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509(b) (emphasis added).
131
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509 cmt.
13 2 1d.
133 See id.
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If a subsequent will that revoked a previous will in whole or
in part is thereafter revoked by another, later will, the
previous will remains revoked in whole or in part, unless it or
its revoked part is revived. The previous will or its revoked
part is revived to the extent it appears from the terms of the
later will that the testator intended the previous will to take
effect.1

4

In other words, there is a presumption against revival of an earlier will if a will
that partially or wholly revokes it is itself subsequently revoked by a third will.
The comment to section 2-509 does not offer any explanation or justification
35
for this result.

C. Critique.
Both versions of section 2-509 are intended to repudiate the common law

rule of automatic revival upon revocation of the "covering" will. However,
compared with the simple elegance of the 1969 version, the 1990 UPC seems
busy and cluttered. It evokes the image of an intersection where presumptions
instead of cars are rushing around at breakneck speed. While there may be some
merit to distinguishing between partial and complete revocation, the game is
simply not worth the candle. A better approach is exemplified by the earlier
version of section 2-509 which creates a weak presumption against revival in
all circumstances but allows the proponent of the prior will considerable leeway
to rebut it by offering various types of extrinsic evidence. If the proponent of
the prior will can persuade a jury that the testator wanted to revive the will, he

or she prevails. Otherwise, the prior will is neither seen nor heard from again.
V.

Anti-Lapse Provisions.
A. An Overview of Anti-Lapse Statutes.

A lapse occurs when the beneficiary under a will predeceases the
testator.1 36 Under these circumstances, the bequest lapses because the will does
137
not transfer the property to the intended beneficiary until the testator's death.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509(c) (emphasis added).
"3 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-509 cmt.
14

136 Aron Leslie Suna, Disinheritanceand the Anti-Lapse Statute, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105, 105

(1969).
13 Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, "I'm Not Quite Dead Yet!": Rethinking the Anti-Lapse Redistributionof
a Dead Beneficiary's Gift, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2013). Strictly speaking, a void gift does
not lapse because it was incapable of taking effect at the time the will was executed. See, Richard F.
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Prior to enactment of anti-lapse statutes, a lapsed specific or general bequest
went to the residuary legatees, while a lapsed residuary bequest went to the
intestate takers.1 38 However, the common law rule only applied when the will
did not specify how the testator wanted the property to be distributed if the
beneficiary predeceased him. 139
Class gifts were treated differently at common law.1 40 Under this
approach, a class gift was divided among those class members who survived
the testator.141 The rationale for this result was that class members who failed
to survive the testator were not regarded as members of the class insofar as their
share or the class gift was concerned.1 42 Thus, a class gift did not lapse unless
all members of the class predeceased the testator. 143
When applicable, an anti-lapse statute does not actually prevent a gift
from lapsing, but rather "redirects" the gift to a substitute taker.1 44 The first
anti-lapse statute was enacted in Massachusetts in 1783 and since then every
state but Louisiana has adopted one. 145 Although these statutes vary from state
to state,1 46 most of them share some common features. For example, most
statutes only apply to relatives who are fairly closely related to the testator.1 47
In addition, they limit substitute takers to the issue of the predeceased
beneficiary.1 48 The gift is generally not saved if the beneficiary dies without
issue since there is no qualifying substitute takers. 149 Furthermore, anti-lapse
statutes usually do not apply to non-relatives of the testator, such as spouses
and stepchildren. 5 0 Modern anti-lapse statutes also apply to void gifts.

Storrow, Wills and Survival, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 456 (2016). The same is true of bequests
that are made to a beneficiary who is dead at the time the will was executed. See also, Raymond C.
O'Brien, Analytical Principle:A Guidefor Lapse, Survivorship, Death without Issue, and the Rule, 10

GEO. MASON L. REV. 383, 388 n. 17 (1988).

138 Erich

Tucker Kimbrough, Lapsing of Testamentary Gifts, Anti-lapse Statutes, and the Expansion of
Uniform Probate Code's Anti-lapse Protection, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 269 (1994).
1 Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 137, at 1021.
140 Kimbrough, supra note 138, at 292.
1'4 Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 137, at 1023.
142 Storrow, supra note 137, at 462.
"3 Kimbrough, supra note 138, at 293.
" Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More Like the Internal

Revenue Code, 77 MlNN. L. REV. 639, 650 (1993).
141 Jeffrey A. Cooper, A Lapse in Judgment: Ruotolo v. Tie jen and Interpretationof Connecticut's

Anti-Lapse Statute, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 204, 208 (2007).
146 Kimbrough, supra note 138, at 271.
47 Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 137, at 1023.

148

Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring ConstructionProblems, 37 EMORY L.J. 323, 336

(1988).
149 Id. at 338.
"0 Id. at 331.
's'

Kimbrough, supra note 138, at 295-296.
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Although some anti-lapse statutes do not expressly apply to class gifts, most
courts apply anti-lapse provisions to them anyway.' 5 2 Thus, if a class member
predeceases the testator, that person's share goes to his issue. If the class
member dies without issue, the anti-lapse statute does not apply and the
common law rule prevails, under which the class gift is split among the
surviving class members.'

53

There are several issues that sometimes arise in connection with antilapse statutes, most of which involve overriding the statutory scheme. The first
issue is whether the statute can be displaced by words of survivorship. A second
issue is whether the testator can override the anti-lapse statute by making an
alternative gift. A third issue is whether a person who has been expressly
disinherited in the will can qualify as a substitute taker under the provisions of
the anti-lapse statute. Finally, there is the question of whether anti-lapse statutes
are limited to wills or whether they may also apply to will substitutes as well.
Because an anti-lapse statute is considered to be a rule of construction
rather than a substantive legislative mandate, it does not apply if the testator
manifests a contrary intent." 4 Therefore, according to the majority rule, express
language of survivorship is sufficient evidence by itself of the testator's intent
to overcome the anti-lapse statute. 55 Thus, if the testator devises property "to
A if he survives me," the gift will lapse if A predeceases the testator.

Polen v. Baker illustrates this approach.' 5 6 In Polen, the testator's will
directed the executor to distribute the residuary estate to five named
beneficiaries "or to the survivors thereof."1 57The children of one of the
beneficiaries, George Baker, who had predeceased the testator, sought to take
his share under the state anti-lapse statute. 158 The executor asked the Probate
Court to construe the residuary clause and the Court ruled that that the
survivorship requirement precluded operation of the anti-lapse statute.' 59 This
60
was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court.1

52

Id. at 293.

'5

Id.

'5

Roberts, supranote 148, at 326.
Id. at 349.

1

156 See Polen v. Baker, 752 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 2001) (holding that the use of the phrase "or to the
survivors thereof' was evidence of testator's intent to avoid antilapse statute); See also Erlenbach v.
Estate of Thompson, 954 P.2d 350, 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) ("Where the testator uses words of
survivorship indicating intention that the devisee shall take the gift only if he survives the testator, the
[antilapse] statute does not apply.")
'57 Polen, 752 N.E.2d at 259.

158 Id.
159
160
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On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court observed that express terms of the
state's anti-lapse statute would operate "[u]nless a contrary intention is
manifested in the will." 161 Relying on an earlier case, 162 the Court declared that
the term "survivors" referred to the survivors named as beneficiaries in the will
and not to the children of predeceased beneficiaries. 163 Thus, the Court held that
George Baker's children were not entitled to a share of the residuary estate.1 64
However, some courts require something more than words of
survivorship to displace an anti-lapse statute.1 65 For example, in Ruotolo v.
Tietjen, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state's anti-lapse statute
was applicable notwithstanding the presence of survivorship language in the
will. 166

In that case, the testator, John Swanson, executed a will whose

residuary clause provided that his stepdaughter, Hazel Brennan, would receive
one-half of his residuary estate "if she survives me...."167 Hazel died seventeen
days before the testator survived by her daughter, Kathleen Smaldone.1 68 Both
the Probate Court and Superior Court ruled that the survivorship language
precluded the anti-lapse statute from preventing Hazel's bequest from
lapsing. 169 However, this decision was reversed by an intermediate appellate
Court, which held that the statute was applicable despite the presence of express
survivorship language. 170
On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the intermediate appellate Court. 171 The Court declared that the purpose of
the anti-lapse statute was to prevent unintended disinheritance and, therefore, it
should be interpreted liberally to achieve that objective.1 72 In addition, the
Court concluded that there was a presumption that the testator intended for his

Id. (citing OHIo REV. CODE 2107.52(B)).
162 See Hamilton v. Pettifor, 135 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1956) (concluding the term "survivors" referred to
the survivors among those named in a residuary clause).
161

163 Polen, 752 N.E.2d at 260-261.
"6 Id. at 263-264.
6'

Edward C. Halbach Jr. & Lawrence

w. Wagner,

The UPC's New Survivorship andAntilapse

Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1105 (1992).
166 See Ruotolo v. Tie jen, 281 Conn. 483, 486 (2007) (holding the language "if she survives me" alone
was insufficient to avoid anti-lapse statute).

167 Id at 485.
168 Id.
169

Id. at 2.

170 See Ruotolo v. Tie jen, 93 Conn. App. 432, 450 (2006). ("[W]ords of survivorship, such as "if she
survives me," alone do not constitute a "provision" in the will for the contingency of the death of a
beneficiary....").
171 Ruotolo, 281 Conn. at 486.
172 Id. at 485 (citing Ruotolo, 93 Conn. App. 432 at 439).
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will to dispose of his entire estate. 173 Consequently, to establish contrary intent,

and thus avoid application of the anti-lapse statute, the Court declared that "the
testator must either unequivocally express that intent or simply provide for an
alternative bequest." 174 Therefore, the Court held that mere words of
survivorship, without more, were not sufficient to override the anti-lapse
statute.17 5
A more reliable way to defeat an anti-lapse statute is to make an
alternative gift. 176 For example, a testator may leave property "to A if he
77
survives me and if A does not survive me, then to B."1 For most courts, this is

sufficient evidence of a contrary intent. 178 However, there is a split of authority
over what happens if both the primary beneficiary and the alternative taker both
predecease the testator.1 79
Estate ofParker180 reflects the view that the anti-lapse statute, at least in
some cases, does not apply to alternative gifts when both the principal
beneficiary and the alternative taker predecease the testator. In that case,
Charles Parker left his residuary estate four separate shares to three sisters and
a brother. 18' Each bequest provided for an alternative beneficiary if the primary
beneficiary failed to survive the testator. 8 2 The will failed to mention another
brother who was deceased at the time the will was executed.1 83 One of the
sisters, Annie, predeceased the testator as did her husband, Luther, the
alternative taker under Charles' will.1 84 Two of Annie and Luther's children
argued that the anti-lapse statute should prevent their parents' bequest from
lapsing.1 85
However, the Surrogate Court rejected this argument, declaring that
"[t]he principle has been well established that section 29 [the anti-lapse statute]
is not operative in a case where the will clearly and plainly expresses the
intention that the bequest shall be effective only in the event that the legatee

173 Id. at 486 (citing Ruotolo, 93 Conn. App. 432 at 447).
1" Id.
1s Id.
176 Roberts, supranote 115, at 357.
177 Another option is to leave property to "A or A's estate." Id. at 359 (internal quotations added).

17' Kimbrough, supranote 138, at 291.

179 Halbach

& waggoner, supra note 165, at 116.
80 See generally In re Estate of Parker, 181 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
8 1 Id. at 712.
182 Id.
183 Id.

14Id.

185 In re Estate of Parker, 181

N.Y.S.2d at 712.
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survived the testator."' 86 Although the Court acknowledged that survivorship
clauses often reflected "the mannerisms of the draftsman" rather than the intent
of the testator, it concluded that in this case, the testator meant what he said.' 87
Consequently, the Court ruled that the property in question would pass as
intestate property instead of going entirely to Annie and Luther's children.1 88
On the other hand, the Court in Estate of Ulrikson,189 reached the
opposite conclusion. In Ulrikson, the testator, Bellida Ulrikson, left her
residuary estate to her brother, Melvin, and her sister, Rodine, and provided,
"in the event that either one of them shall predecease me, then to the other
surviving brother or sister."' 90 Melvin was survived by two children, Annabelle
and Mavis, while Rodine died without issue.191 According to the Court, if the
anti-lapse statute applied, the entire residuary estate would be divided between

Anabelle and Mavis; however, if the residuary bequest lapsed, Belida's
residuary estate would go by intestacy.1 92 If this occurred, the estate would be
distributed to the issue of Belida's other two siblings, Sena as well as to
Annabelle and Mavis.' 93
After reviewing several statutes, the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that they manifested a preference for testacy over intestacy and also
dictated that the anti-lapse statute be applied unless a contrary intention
appeared in the will.1 94 The Court then rejected the argument that the
alternative gift imposed an absolute condition of survivorship as far as the
residuary bequest was concerned.' 95 Instead, the Court reasoned that the
testator simply failed to anticipate that both her siblings would predecease
her.1 96 In addition, according to the Court, "words of survivorship" could only
be effective if "there [were] survivors."' 97 Thus, in the absence of an effective
survivorship clause, "the anti-lapse statute [was] free to operate."1 98

Id. at 712-13.
$'Id. at 713.

186

188 Id. at 714. This presumably meant that issue of the brother who was not mentioned in the will, if
there were any, would take an intestate share.
189 See generally In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.W.2d 757 (Minn.

was applicable absent clear intention to the contrary).

190 Id. at 759.
191 Id.
92 Id.

Id.
9 In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.w.2d at 759.
195 Id
196 Id.
197 Id.
19

198 Id.

1980) (holding the anti-lapse statute
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Another interesting question arises when a beneficiary predeceases the
testator survived by a person that the testator has expressly disinherited. The

courts appear to be evenly split over whether express disinheritance is evidence
of contrary intent.199 For example, in McKeon's Estate,200 the Court declined
to apply the anti-lapse statute. In that case, the testator made a bequest to her
sister, Annie, and in a subsequent codicil left her one-half of her residuary
estate. 20 1 Annie predeceased the testator, "survived by a child, Catherine
Doughtery Smith." 202 In a codicil executed prior to her death, the testator
revoked an earlier bequest to Catherine stating that "I hereby declare and direct
203
that my said niece [Catherine] shall receive no part of my estate."
The executors contended that Annie's bequest lapsed at her death and
passed as intestate property to the testator's distributees 204 Conversely,
Catherine argued that she should be substituted as a statutory beneficiary under
the anti-lapse statute. 205 The Surrogate Court concluded that the anti-lapse
should not be allowed to "nullify the right of the testator to select the objects of
[her] bounty." 206 In the Court's view, the testator made it clear that Catherine
should not be substituted as a beneficiary if her mother predeceased the
testator. 207 Accordingly, the Court ruled that Annie's share would pass to the
testator's distributees under the laws of intestacy. 208
However, a California intermediate appellate Court took another view in
Estate ofRoberts.20 9 In that case, the testator, Lila Roberts, executed a will that
left various bequests to her son and grandchildren. 2 10 Two of her grandchildren,
Turner and Lila Helen, were the children of the testator's deceased son, Archie.
The other three grandchildren were the children of the testator's other son,
212
Watkins. 211 Two of them, Gerald and David, received substantial gifts
However, the remaining grandson, Richard, received only one dollar. 213

199

Kimbrough, supra note 138, at 287.
re Estate of McKeon, 46 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
201 Id. at 350-51.
202 Id. at 351.
200In

203 Id.
204 Id.
20s In re Estate of McKeon, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
206
207

Id.
Id.

200 Id. (however, the court pointed out that Catherine could still take a share of the lapsed gift since she
was a distributee). Id. at 352.
209
210
211

Estate of Roberts, 9 Cal. App. 3d. 396 (1970).
Id. at 397.

Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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Watkins, who was alive when the will was executed, was named as the
residuary beneficiary. 214
Watkins died before the testator.215 However, prior to his death, the
testator was declared incompetent and, therefore, was not able to name a new
residuary legatee. 216 After the testator died, her executor petitioned the Court
to order that the residuary estate be distributed to Watkin's lineal heirs, Gerald,
Richard, and David. 217 However, Turner and Lila Helen argued that the antilapse statutes should not apply and that the residuary estate should be divided
They reasoned that the
equally among all of the grandchildren. 2 18
disinheritance of Richard indicated that the testator did not want her property
to be distributed according to the provisions of the anti-lapse statute. 2 19 In
response, the Court declared that that disinheritance was not sufficient evidence
of an intent to displace the anti-lapse statute. 220 The Court speculated that the
testator did not intend for nominal bequest to Richard to be a disinheritance,
but felt at the time the will was executed that Richard was too young to manage
his own property and that Watkins would see that Richard was properly
provided for at a later time.22' Consequently, the three grandchildren of
Watkins took his share of the estate under the anti-lapse statute.222
B. The Uniform Probate Code.
The original Uniform Probate Code contained many of the features
commonly found in American anti-lapse statutes. 223 It was well-received,
eventually being adopted in sixteen states.224 Like most of these statutes, the
Code limited the scope of its anti-lapse provisions to beneficiaries who were
either grandparents or lineal descendants of grandparents. 2 5 If the intended
beneficiary predeceased the testator, the bequest would go instead to issue of
the beneficiary who survived the testator by 120 hours. 226 The Code's anti-lapse
provisions not only applied to beneficiaries who died after the execution of the
will, but they also extended to beneficiaries who were dead at the time the will

214 Estate of Roberts, 9 Cal. App. 3d. at 397.

215 Id.
216 Id.
217

Id.

218

Id.

2

Estate of Roberts, 9 Cal. App. 3d. at 397.
220 Id. at 398-99.
221 Id. at 399.
222 Id.
223 Kimbrough, supra note 138, at 271.
224
225

Id at 297.
UNIF. PROB. CODE

226 Id.

§ 2-605 (1969).
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was executed; and finally, the Code's anti-lapse provisions also applied to class
gifts. 227 If a class member predeceased the testator, that person's share would
go to his issue. However, if there was no issue, the deceased class member's
22 8
share would go to the surviving class members.
The 1990 UPC anti-lapse provision 229 made significant changes and
230
The 1969 anti-lapse provision was only seven
additions to the 1969 version.

lines long, whereas the 1990 version was eighty-one lines long, followed by
eight pages of comments. The new version was an ambitious attempt to resolve
some of the issues that had arisen in the past under simpler state anti-lapse
23
statutes. 1
Section 2-603(b) is concerned with substitute gifts. In its preamble,
section 2-603(b) limits the anti-lapse provisions to the traditional parties,
namely grandparents and descendants of grandparents, but adds stepchildren to
the class of persons who are also included as beneficiaries whose bequests may

232
Section 2-603(b)(1)
be protected against lapse if they predecease the testator.

states that if a deceased individual beneficiary leaves descendants, a substitute
233
In
gift will be created in these descendants who will take by representation.
his
to
goes
share
member's
class
deceased
the
gift
class
a
of
the case
descendants, if any, by representation. 234
With the exception of the extension the Code's anti-lapse protection to
stepchildren,

most

of the

foregoing

provisions

are

not particularly

controversial. However, section 2-603(b)(3), which deals with survivorship
language, is another matter entirely. This provision declares that "words of
survivorship, such as in a devise to an individual 'if he survives me,' or in a
devise to 'my surviving children," are not, in the absence of additional
evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent contrary to the application of this
section."235 In the comment to section 2-603, the drafters rebut the formalistic
argument that survivorship language makes the gift conditional upon
survivorship and when the beneficiary predeceases the testator the bequest fails

227 Id.
221 UNIF. PROB. CODE
229 UNIF. PROB. CODE

§ 2-605,
§ 2-603.

235 Kimbrough, supra note
21

comment.

138, at 271.

Id. at 300.

232 Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 148, at 1121 (the comment points out that this provision does not

extend anti-lapse protection to descendants of the testator's stepchildren or to stepchildren of any of
the testator's other relatives). UNIF. COMM. CODE § 2-603, cmt.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(1).
Id. at § 2-603(b)(2).
235 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(3). UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-702(a) requires one to survive another by
120 hours in order to be considered a survivor. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603, cmt.
233

234

254

QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

because the anti-lapse statute has nothing to preserve. 236 They point out that
sections (b)(1) and (2) provide that the predeceased beneficiary's descendants
take any property to which the beneficiary would have been entitled under the
will had he survived the testator. 237 The drafters also express skepticism about
whether boilerplate language of survivorship reflects the testator's actual
intent.2 38
The comment also justifies the approach taken by section 2-603 by
arguing that it is remedial in nature and should be allowed to operate unless
there is clear evidence of contrary intent on the part of the testator:
In the absence of persuasive evidence of a contrary intent, however, the
anti-lapse statute, being remedial in nature, and tending to preserve equality
among different lines of succession, should be given the widest possible chance
to operate and should be defeated only by a finding of intention that directly
contradicts the substitute gift created by the statute. Mere words of
survivorship-by themselves-do not directly contradict
the
statutory
substitute gift to the descendants of a deceased devisee.239
Section 2-603(b)(4), as clarified by a technical amendment in 2008,
declares that a statutory substitute gift will be superseded if the testator's will
expressly provides for an alternative beneficiary under either of two
circumstances. First, the anti-lapse provision will not apply if the alternative
bequest is in the form of a class gift and one or more members of the class is
entitled to take under the will. 240 For example, assume that the testator's will
leaves "$10,000.00 to my son, A, if he is living at my death, and if he is not
living at my death, to A's children." Assume further that A and A's child, X,
predecease the testator, survived by A's other child, Y, and X's children, M and
N. In that case, the anti-lapse provision would not apply, and Y would receive
the entire bequest. 241

Second, the anti-lapse provision will not apply if the alternative bequest
is not in the form of a class gift and the expressly designated beneficiary of the
alternative devise is entitled to take under the will. 242 For example, if the
testator's will leaves property "to A if A survives me, but if A does not survive
me, then to B," the property goes to B, rather than to A's descendants. 243
236 UNIF. PROB. CODE
237 id.
238 Id.
239

Id.

UNIF.
241 UNIF.
242 UNIF.
243 UNIF.
240

§ 2-603 cmt.

PROB. CODE
PROB. CODE
PROB. CODE
PROB. CODE

§ 2-603(b)(4)(A).

§ 2-603

cmt.

§ 2-603(b)(4)(B).

§ 2-603

cmt.

2021]

THESE ARE A FEW OF MY LEAST FAVORITE THINGS

255

The comment also addresses the question of what happens when both the
primary and the alternative taker predecease the testator. If, for example, the
testator's will leaves property "to A if A survives me, but if A does not survive
me, then to B," and both A and B fail to survive the testator, but both leave
descendants, A's descendants would take because B, the "expressly designated
devisee of the alternative devise," would not be entitled to take under the will
even if B was survived by descendants.24 4
Section 603(c)(2) sets forth an exception to this rule and provides that
that a bequest will not pass under the primary substitute gift if there is a younger
generation devise. 245 This is illustrated by the following example in the
comment to section 2-603: The testator's will devises $5,000.00 to his son A, if
he is living at his death; if not, to his daughter, B. The testator also devises
$7,500.00 to his daughter, B, if she is living at his death, if not, to his son, A. A
and B both predecease the testator, leaving descendants. Under section 2603(c), A's descendants take the $5,000.00 devise as substitute takers for A and
B's descendants take the $7,500.00 devise as substitute takers for B. Since each
devise contains an alternative devise, one to the other, the question of which
substitute gift takes effect is resolved by determining which of the devisees
would have taken the property if each of them had survived the testator. Under
these circumstances, A would have taken the $5,000.00 devise and B would
have taken the $7,500.00 devise. Therefore, their respective descendants would
take under the anti-lapse statute.
C. Critique.
The 1990 Code's anti-lapse provisions, particularly section 2-603(b)(3),
24 6
are highly controversial and have not been widely adopted. Indeed, there is
a lot to dislike about many aspects of section 2-603. Compared with the
simplicity and elegance of the 1969 version, section 2-603 is excessively

complex and wordy. It is no wonder that state legislatures have given it a wide
berth. Furthermore, estate planners in jurisdictions that have adopted section
2-603 have every reason to be concerned about increased malpractice exposure
if they fail to master its convoluted provisions. In addition, if the provisions of
section 2-603 are applied to older wills, the expectations of testators and their
2 47
lawyers who relied on prior statutes and court decisions may be frustrated.

244

Id.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(c)(2).
246 Robert H. Sitkoff & Jesse Dukeminier, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 361 (10fi ed. 2017).
247 Ascher, supra note 144, at 653-54.
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QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL

256

[Vol. 34

Unfortunately, the provisions of section 2-603 seem less concerned with
carrying out testators' intent than imposing the drafters' views on everyone. In
the words of Professor Archer:
Apparently, the revisers believe their own anti-lapse
provisions are likely to reflect any particular testator's intent
more faithfully than the testator's own will. This conclusion
is not only pretentious, it disputes what should be obviousthat most testators expect their wills to dispose of their
property completely-without interference from a statute of
which they have never even heard.248
The best solution is to return to the 1969 UPC's anti-lapse provision Another

solution would be to declare that words of survivorship would prevent the antilapse provisions from operating unless there was clear evidence in the will that
the testator wished them to apply.24 9 Another recommendation would be to
provide that the anti-lapse provisions would not apply if the testator made an
alternative gift of the property. This would also make section 2-603(c)
unnecessary. If the problem of both alternative beneficiaries predeceasing the
testator were to arise, it could be resolved by the courts.
VI.

Ademption by Extinction.
A.

Ademption by Extinction.

The term "ademption" means "a taking away."250 There are two forms of
ademption: ademption by extinction and ademption by satisfaction.25s
Ademption by extinction applies to specifically bequeathed property that is no
longer in the estate at the testator's death because it has been sold, destroyed,
given away, or sufficiently altered that it cannot be substituted for the original
bequest.25 2 When this occurs, the bequest is extinguished and the beneficiary
takes nothing in lieu of the missing property.25 3 If only a portion of the property

is removed from the estate during the testator's lifetime, the bequest is adeemed
pro tanto.254 In contrast, ademption by satisfaction occurs when the testator

248

Id. at 654 (emphasis in original).

249 Ascher, supra note 144, at 653.

250 Joseph Warren, The History ofAdemption, 25 IoWA L. REV. 290, 296 (1940).
2s1 Joshua A. Mullen, Property-Administrationof Wills-Common Law Ademption by Extinction
and

the Applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 32-3-111, 75 TENN. L. REv. 577, 579 (2008).

252 Nicole M. Paschoal, The Problem of Replacement Propertyin the Law of Ademption,
44 ACTEC L.J.

183, 186 (2019).

253 Ascher, supra note 144, at 643.

254 Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills and Other Principles of Succession including
Intestacy and Administration of the Decedents Estate § 134 at 745 (2d ed. 1953).
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makes an inter vivos gift of the property in question to the person named as the
beneficiary in the will. 255 The amount of the inter vivos gift will be deducted
25 6
from the bequest if the testator so intends.

1. The Identity Theory.
There are two basic approaches to the treatment of beneficiaries whose
legacies have been adeemed. One approach is the identity or in specie theory.
A court which applies this rule must determine whether the devise is specific
or not and if it is specific, whether the property in question is in the estate at the
testator's death.257 The identity theory is not concerned with the testator's
intent. 258 For example, in McGee v. McGee,25 9 the testator bequeathed money
on deposit "in any bank" to her grandchildren. 260 However, a few weeks before
the testator's death, her son, Richard, acting pursuant to a durable power of
attorney, withdrew a considerable sum of money from the testator's savings
account at the People's Savings Bank and used it to purchase United States

treasury bonds. 261 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
bequest to the grandchildren was specific and that conversion of the money
deposited in the savings account to treasury bonds adeemed the grandchildren's
legacy.2 62
Over the years, the courts have developed a number of questionable
practices to defeat the identity theory when they feel that it would frustrate the
testator's estate plan: (1) they may characterize the change in the nature of the
property in question as a change in form rather than a change in substance; (2)

they may construe the devise as general or demonstrative instead of specific; or
(3) they may conclude that the will speaks at the time of death rather than at the
time of execution. 263

A great many courts hold that a specific devise is not adeemed if the
264
Parkerv. Bozian illustrates how this rule
property has changed only in form.

255 Mary Kay Lundwall, The Case Against the Ademption by Extinction Rule: A Proposalfor Reform,

29 GoNZ. L. REV. 105, 105 (1993).
256 Id.
25 Gregory S. Alexander, Ademption and the Domain of Formalityin Wills Law, 55 ALB. L. REV.
1067, 1068 (1992).
25 Pascboal, supra note 252, at 185.
259 McGee v. McGee, 413 A.2d 72 (RI. 1980).
260 Id. at 73.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 78.

26' Lundwall, supranote 255, at 110.
264 Alexander, supra note 257, at 1074.
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of construction works. 265 Effie Wilson executed a will in 1995 in which she
bequeathed her "CD Account # XXX-XXX1274 with the First Bank of
Dothan" to her niece, Marguerite Bozian. 266 She also left her residuary estate
to another niece, Sara Parker. 26 7 Later, in 2000, the testator transferred the funds
in the CD 1274 account into two new CD accounts, CD 2843 and CD 2844,

which paid a higher rate of interest. 268 After the testator died in 2001, her niece,
Sara Parker, acting as executor, refused to transfer the CDs to Marguerite,
claiming that the original CD had been adeemed by extinction when the testator
cashed it in and used the proceeds to purchase CD 2843 and 2844.269 According
to Sara, having been adeemed, the CDs would go to her as the residuary
legatee.27 0 However, the lower Court's ruling in favor of Marguerite was
affirmed on appeal by the Alabama Supreme Court.2 7 1 The Court concluded
that the transfer of the money in CD 1274 into the new CDs was a change in
form rather than a change in substance.2 72
Another dodge is to classify the property as general or demonstrative
instead of specific.27 3 For example, in Estates ofDoepke,2 7 4 when the decedent
bequeathed her son the sum of $3,000.00, "being the amount of life insurance
left by my husband to me," the Court concluded that the bequest was not
adeemed even though the insurance fund no longer existed. The Washington
Supreme Court held that the gift was demonstrative and not specific,
concluding that the reference to the insurance policy was merely descriptive.
Accordingly, the Court ordered the bequest to be paid out of the estate's general

assets.
The third method of avoiding ademption is to treat the will as speaking
at the time of death rather than at the time of execution. 275 For example, if the
265 Parkerv. Bozian, 859 So. 2d 427 (Ala. 2003).
266 Id. at 430.
267
268
269

Id.
Id.
Id

270 Parkerv. Bozian, 859 So. 2d. at 433.

27 Id. at 439.

22 Id. at 438.

Alexander, supra note 257, at 1073-74. Property that is disposed of by will
is classified as specific,
general, demonstrative or residuary. As the term suggests, a specific devise involves a unique piece of
tangible property such as real estate, art or jewelry, while a general bequest involves cash or other
fungible goods. A demonstrative bequest is a gift of a specific sum of money from a named source
instead of from the general assets of the estate. For example, a bequest of "$10,000 from the First
National Bank of Cincinnati" would be demonstrative in nature. If there was not enough money in the
account to pay the legacy, the deficit would be paid as a general bequest. A residuary bequest includes
all property that is not otherwise disposed of. See William M. McGovern, Sheldon F. Kurtz & David
273

M. English, Wills, Trusts and Estates § 8.1 (4t' ed. 2001).
274 In re Estates of Doepke, 47 P.2d 1009 (Wash. 1935).
275 Alexander, supranote 257, at 1075.
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testator in a will executed in 2010 leaves her 2009 Lexus LS 460 automobile to
her son, Alfred, the bequest will probably be classified as specific and will be
adeemed if it is not in the testator's estate at her death in 2020. On the other
hand, if the testator simply leaves "my automobile" to Alfred, a court may treat
this more generic description as referring to whatever automobile the testator
owns at death, thereby avoiding ademption. Of course, this technique depends
27 6
on what words and phrases the drafter of the will chooses to employ.
2. The Intent Theory.

As the name implies, the identity theory focuses on whether the testator
intended for the bequest to be adeemed. 277 This approach was apparently part
of the Roman civil law and was also followed for a time by the English
Chancery and ecclesiastical courts. 278 It continues to be followed in a minority
279
The Comment to section 2-606 cites
of jurisdictions in the United States.
Estate ofAustin as an example of the intent theory. 280 In that case, the testator,
Lucille Ann Austin, executed a will in 1977 which left an oil painting and a
281
The promissory note was paid
promissory note to her friend, Betty Guldberg.

off prior to Lucille's death. 282 After depositing the funds in a savings account,
the testator withdrew money from the account in order to purchase another
promissory note. 283 The testator died about ten months after the will was
executed without having changed the bequest to Betty.284 The residuary legatee,
the Shrine Hospital for Crippled Children, contended that the bequest of the
285
promissory note was adeemed when the debtor paid it off. The trial court
agreed and held that the bequest was specific and adeemed and, therefore, went
to the Hospital as the residuary legatee. 286

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed and held that there was nothing
to indicate that the testator had changed her mind about leaving the bequest to
Betty. 287 The Court observed that Lucille had reinvested the proceeds from the

Lundwall, supra note 255, at 114.
Mary Kay Lundwall, The Case Against the Ademption by Extinction Rule: A Proposalfor Reform,
29 Gonz. L. Rev. 105, 108 (1993).
276
2,7

278 Id.

279 Pascoal, supra note 252, at 192.

Estate ofAustin, 169 Cal. Rptr. 648 (Ct. App. 1980).
Id at 649.
282 Id. at 649-50.
283 Id. at 650.
28 Id.
28s Estate ofAustin, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
280
281

286 Id.
2 87

Id. at 651.
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promissory note in an identical type of asset and she did not revoke her bequest
of the oil painting to Betty. 288 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no
evidence to suggest that the testator intended to adeem the bequest of the
promissory note. 289

B. The Uniform Probate Code.
The ademption provisions of the 1969 UPC were fairly traditional in
nature. 290 After stating the identity rule relating to the ademption of property
not found in the testator's estate at death, section 2-607 provided that specific
devisees of securities would be entitled to additional securities of the same
entity owned by the testator by reason of actions initiated by the entity as well
as securities of another entity owned by the testator as the result of a corporate
reorganization initiated by the that entity.29' Another provision created four
limited exceptions to the identity theory when the testator was not under a
conservatorship. 292
The 1990 UPC retains much of this, but also adds a number of
controversial provisions. The Code begins by declaring that the beneficiary of
specifically devised property is entitled to any of the devised property that
remains in the testator's estate at death. 293 Next, section 2-606 (a) incorporates
the very limited exceptions set forth in the 1969 UPC, namely the balance of
the purchase price of any property owed by the purchaser at the testator's
death, 294 the amount of any condemnation award unpaid at the testator's
death, 295 any proceeds unpaid at death on fire or casualty insurance for injury
to the testator's property, 296 and any property acquired as the result of a

foreclosure of a security interest for a specifically devised obligation. 297

1.

Replacement Property.

Section 2-606 (a) (5) contains a new provision which saves a gift from
ademption when it qualifies as a "replacement" for property that had been sold

289 Id. at 652.
290 Alexander, supranote 257, at 1076.
291
292

UNIF. PROB. CODE
Id.

§ 2-607

(1969).

293 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-606 (a) (1990).
294 Id. at 2-606 (a)(1).

§
§ 2-606 (a)(2).
296 Id at § 2-606 (a)(3).
297 Id. at § 2-606 (a)(4).
295 Id. at
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or otherwise disposed of by the testator.298 The drafters of the this new
provision claim that it is merely an extension of the traditional change in form
doctrine. 299 Unfortunately, neither the language of section 2-606 (a) (5) nor the
examples set forth in the Comment to section 2-606 provide much guidance as
300
to what constitutes replacement property.

The Comment provides the following example of the replacement
concept. G's will devised "my 1984 Ford" to X. She subsequently sold the
vehicle and bought a 1988 Buick. Later, G sold the Buick and purchased a 1993
Chrysler. According to the Comment, X would receive the Chrysler as a
replacement for the Ford. 301 Furthermore, X would receive any vehicle that G
owned at G's death under section 2-606 (a) (5) even if it had not been purchased
302
with funds that were not obtained from the sale of one of the other vehicles.
2.

Adoption of the Intent Theory.

Section 2-606 (a) (6) provides for a pecuniary devise equal to the value
as of its date of disposition of other specifically devised property disposed of
303
The pecuniary devise is only to the extent it is
during the testator's lifetime.

established that ademption would be inconsistent with the testator's manifested
plan of distribution or that at the time the will was made, the date of disposition
3 04 When this
or otherwise, the testator did not intend ademption of the devise.
verbose and convoluted sentence is reduced to plain English, it essentially states

that a bequest will not be adeemed unless the testator clearly wants it to be.
3.

Conservatorsand Attorneys-in-Fact.

Sections 2-606 (b) through (e) address the troublesome question of
whether property sold by conservators or holders of a durable power of attorney
should cause such property to be adeemed. 305 Section 2-606 (b) provides that if
specifically devised property is sold or mortgaged by a conservator or an agent

acting pursuant to a durable power of attorney for an incapacitated testator, or

290 See Ascher, supra note 144, at 645-47.

299 Alexander, supranote 257, at 1077-78.
300 Pascoal, supra note 252, at 192.

301 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-606, cmt (1990).

302 Id However, if G used the proceeds from the sale of the Ford to purchase shares in a mutual fund,
X would not receive them as replacement property.
303 Id.
304Id. at § 2-606 (a)(6).

305 See generally Alexander, supranote 257, at 1070-73.

QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL

262

[Vol. 34

if certain proceeds are paid to them, the specific devisee is given the right to a
general pecuniary devise equal to such sale price or proceeds. 306

C. Critique.
Section 2-606 has been criticized by some legal commentators3 07 and, as
of 2019, only five states have adopted it in its entirety. 308 One problem is that
section 2-606 tries to recognize both the identity theory and the intent theory of
ademption instead of making a firm commitment to one or the other. 309 The
result is unnecessary complexity and confusion which is certain to promote
litigation. Sections 2-606 (a) (5) and 2-606 (a) (6) are the worst offenders.
Section 2-606 (a) (5) adopts a replacement property approach without clearly

describing what is meant by that term.3 10 Section 2-606 (a) (6) is also flawed. 311
Having suggested at the beginning of § 2-606 (a) that the identity theory may
be a proper default rule, the drafters then reverse course in section 2-606 (a) (6)
and declare that ademption will not occur unless there is clear proof that the
testator intends it.312
Each of these theories, standing alone, has its strong points. For example,
it is said that the identity theory is "logical, simple and... easy to apply." 31 3 In
addition, it reduces confusion and discourages litigation, and avoids unseemly
inquiries into the testator's state of mind.3 1 4 On the other hand, strict application
of the identity theory will sometimes frustrate the testator's plan of
distribution. 315
In contrast, by definition, the intent theory is more likely to effectuate the
testator's intent, especially when the property in question changes form, is
destroyed or is sold or otherwise disposed of by someone other than the
testator. 316 That being said, proving intent often involves the admission of

306

3 07

UNIF. PROB. CODE

§ 2-606 (b).

Ascher, supranote 144, at 645-49.; But see, Alexander, supranote 257, at 1068 (declaring that
"Section 2-606 represents a sensible doctrinal reform that incrementally changes the law in a way that
is likely to strengthen the extent to which wills law reflects rather than frustrates testamentary
preferences.").
3"5 Pascoal, supra note 252, at 194.
3a9 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-606.
310
311

12

Id.

See generally Ascher, supra note 144, at 646-48.

Id. at 647.

3" Philip Mechem,

Specifc Legacies of Unspecific Things-Ashburner v. MacguireReconsidered, 87

U. PA. L. REV. 546, 550 (1939).
314 Lundwall, supra note 255,
at 108.
3" Id. at 109.
316 Gregory S. Alexander, Ademption and the Domain of Formality in Wills
Law, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1067,
1067 (1992).
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extrinsic evidence, such as hearsay, that may be unreliable or downright
false. 317 In any event, one can argue that the intent theory will generate

litigation.
While neither the identity theory nor the intent theory provides an optimal
solution to the ademption problem, a combination of the two, the approach
chosen by the drafters of section 2-606, is worse than either. Perhaps, the best
option is to return to the 1969 UPC which generally followed the identity theory
but identified four very specific exceptions where it was highly unlikely that
the testator would want the bequest to be adeemed. 318 Like the general rule,
these exceptions would be per se rules that would not involve an inquiry into
the testator's probable intent.
VII. Conclusion.
Although there is much to like about the 1990 UPC, some of its
innovations are problematic. In many cases, the new provisions add
unnecessary complexity in order to solve relatively trivial problems. Other
provisions are vague and open-ended when bright-line rules would be better.
The problem of unnecessary complication is exemplified by the per
capita at each generation rule in section 2-106.319 This provision may achieve

a slight degree of additional fairness, but it also introduces significant
mathematical challenges into the law of intestacy. Section 2-503, the harmless
error rule, on the other hand, is not particularly complex.3 20 Rather, as written,

2
it is vague and open-ended, thereby opening the door to increased litigation. 1
To be sure, the strict compliance rule sometimes frustrated testators' intent and
enriched unintended beneficiaries. However, the Code's response seems like
overkill. The 1969 UPC's approach, which did away with a number of
questionable wills act formalities was a better approach to the strict compliance
problem. At the very least, if the Code's harmless error rule is retained at all, it

should be expressly limited to noncompliance with attestation requirements.
Excessive complexity also rears its ugly head in section 2-509, which

deals with the doctrine of revival.32 2 Instead of retaining the 1969 UPC's intentbased approach, section 2-509 creates a complex system of presumptions based

3

Id.

318

Ascher, supra note 144, at 645.

319 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-106.
320 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-503.

321 Id.
322 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-509.
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on whether the covering will is wholly or partially revoked by physical act or
whether it is revoked by a subsequent testamentary instrument. 323 Although the
1969 UPC's intent-based approach necessarily relied on extrinsic evidence,
always a legitimate concern, it had the virtue of producing a simple and
reasonably reliable solution to the revival problem without recourse to all of the
1990 Code's bells and whistles.
The 1990 UPC's provision on lapsed gifts manages to combine bad
policy with excessive complexity in the subsections dealing with survivorship
requirements and substitute gifts.3 2 4 Until the promulgation of section 2-603,

drafters could usually rely on words of survivorship in a bequest to preclude
the anti-lapse statute from operating. 325 Although the use of boilerplate
language sometimes led to unintended consequences, there is no reason to
suppose that this was common. Now, in those states that have adopted section

2-603, drafters run the risk of malpractice liability unless they put additional
language into their clients' wills. 32 6
The Code also unnecessarily complicates the issue of alternative gifts.
The phrase "to A if she survives me and if A does not survive me, to B" is about
as explicit as one can get. 327 However, section 2-603 introduces a number of
complex rules, along with a lengthy Comment, to determine what happens
when both the primary and the alternative taker fail to survive the testator. 328
While all of this is interesting, it might be better to replace the current section
2-603 with the 1969 UPC's more elegant version.
Section 2-606 is both disingenuous and unnecessarily prolix. The section
is disingenuous because it purports to adopt the identity theory of ademption
by extinction and then creates a series of six intent-based exceptions that
virtually swallow up the general rule.32 9 The first four exceptions are carryovers
from the 1969 UPC and are fairly modest in scope.3 3 0 However, the remaining
exceptions are quite troublesome, particularly the provision relating to
"replacement property." 33 ' This is almost certain to be a litigation breeder

because almost anything can be a replacement if a court decides that it should
be.

323

id.

"4 UNIF. PROB. CODE §2-603.
325 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-603.
326 Id.
327
328

Id.
Id.

329 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-606.
330 See id.
331

Id. at §2-606 (a)(5).
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Perhaps, it is time to consider an overhaul of the current UPC. The five
provisions discussed in this Article might be a good place to start.

